In my previous blog post, I reflected on the uneasy relationship between REKO and Facebook, framing it as a dependency shaped by opaque algorithmic governance and platform power. That reflection ended with an open question: where do we go from here? Several months later, the answer remains unresolved, but it has become clearer that REKO’s present is defined less by dramatic rupture and more by everyday adaptation.
Our research shows there isn’t one collective attempt to “leave Facebook”, nor a clear alternative platform waiting to take over, even though a new website to collect orders exist. Instead, a large part of REKO producers and consumers are learning to live with the algorithm and adapt to it. This is not a passive process but instead tacit knowledge and small strategic adjustments that acknowledge platform power without openly confronting it.
Producers experiment with the timing of posting their offers. Admins share a post when it’s time for a new order and pick-up. Consumers set reminders to check on the group at the appropriate interval. There is an understanding that behaviour needs to adapt to the consequences of algorithmic filtering. The members of REKO have developed a certain level of algorithmic literacy. The algorithmic control is almost accepted as a background condition to what is possible.
At the same time, we see a new attempt to move away from Facebook as sole infrastructure through a website where consumers can order directly from the producers. When visiting the website, one picks the REKO ring of choice and then scrolls through the offerings, putting produce in the digital basket. At check-out, payment happens vis Swish, the same as before when using Facebook. The website gathers all the offers for the consumer, providing a product overview. It does however, distance the consumer from the producer as the product and not the producer is centred. The producers gain a more streamlined ordering process during which they don’t need to struggle with Facebook comment fields and notifications.
As of now, this website is geographically limited, and it still refers to the Facebook groups. This website does not yet replace Facebook; it patches a couple of weaknesses. The website creates redundancy for the relational and platform-based REKO model. However, it is unclear if the lack of relationality in using a website might work against the ethos of REKO.
Reko is often discussed in terms of resistance to corporate food systems, though its relationship to digital platforms is more pragmatic than ideological. Facebook is not embraced, it is tolerated. It is seen as an unavoidable intermediary—powerful, unreliable, and increasingly misaligned with REKO’s needs.
An added complication is the generational gap we see among Facebook users. It has become a platform for the middle-aged and older. Younger consumers are less likely to use Facebook and are therefore more likely to either be unaware of REKO and how it is organised, or to see REKO’s reliance on Facebook as outdated. Yet, REKO can’t just move on to TikTok or Instagram as both platforms require continuous content production and aesthetic labour that isn’t just outside REKO’s ethos but one might argue diametrically opposed. It isn’t a technical problem; it is a value conflict.
The question of REKO’s sustainability shifts. It isn’t simply whether Facebook will continue to “allow” REKO to exist, nor whether a better platform can be found, though both are valuable questions. The deeper issue is whether alternative food networks can maintain their low-intensity, trust-based coordination within an attention economy that rewards constant activity, visibility, and growth.
REKO appropriates tools that operate with a different value proposition. As Srnicek (2017) argues, the whole business model of platforms is based on amassing data, both to tailor their services and reel consumers further in, and to sell it for targeted advertising. Data is the new oil. REKO’s build in reluctance to create continuous user engagement and endless streams of data are almost counter-cultural.
REKO’s reliance on Facebook is therefore not simply a question of convenience or technological lag, but a window into a broader tension between alternative economies and extractive digital infrastructures. As platforms continue to optimize for data, engagement, and growth, REKO’s slow, relational, and episodic practices appear increasingly out of place. Yet it is precisely this misfit that makes REKO analytically interesting. The question is no longer whether REKO can find the “right” platform, but whether platform capitalism has room for forms of coordination that deliberately refuse to spew endless streams of data-oil.
by Steffi Siegert
References
Srnicek, N. (2016). Platform Capitalism. Polity.